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Introduction
Firms embracing a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) regime take into account not only the shareholder interests (pro…t), but also how the …rm decisions a¤ect the agents dealing with the …rm (stakeholders), such as employees, business partners, consumers and environment. 1 The purposes of a …rm choosing to follow CSR rules are not necessarily related to environmental or social care. Lambertini and Tampieri (2010) show that, in a Cournot oligopoly where an environmental externality takes place, one …rm adopting CSR rules (i.e., internalising its own pollution and caring of consumer surplus) obtains higher pro…ts than the pro…t-seeking competitors. Hence a …rm can decide to be CSR not because moved not by altruistic behaviour but by economic convenience. What the analysis carried by Lambertini and Tampieri (2010) puts aside is the possibility that …rms can change their type. In particular, if the CSR …rm makes higher pro…ts it is natural to imagine that pro…t-seeking …rms may want to shift to CSR, casting doubts on the stability of the equilibrium.
In this paper we depart from that standpoint by showing the condi- 1 There is not a unique de…nition of Corporate Social Responsibility. To cite some, for the World Business Council for Sustainable Development in its publication "Making Good Business Sense" (Holme and Watts), "Corporate Social Responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at large" . The CSR de…nition used by Business for Social
Responsibility is "Operating a business in a manner that meets or exceeds the ethical, legal, commercial and public expectations that society has of business" . The European Commission hedges its bets with two de…nitions wrapped into one: "A concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment.
A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis". For a summary, see www.mallenbaker.net/csr/de…nition.php.
tions for which a mixed oligopoly equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium where pro…t-seeking and CSR …rms coexist, is stable. We take the same setup of Lambertini and Tampieri (2010) , studying a static Cournot oligopoly where production determines a negative environmental externality and one CSR …rm is present. Compared to Lambertini and Tampieri (2010), here we consider a pre-market stage where …rms can change type both in a duopoly and oligopoly, and we study the conditions such that mixed equilibrium is stable.
Our results show that a low impact of productivity on pollution and a high CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus allows stability of a mixed duopoly.
Moreover, in the oligopoly case the mixed oligopoly is stable if number of CSR …rms needs to be su¢ ciently low. Then we show an example of the results of oligopoly through a numerical simulation. shows the oligopoly case and a numerical example of it. Section 5 concludes.
The model
We study a static oligopoly market where n 2 …rms compete à la Cournot.
Firms supply a homogeneous good, whose market demand function is p = a Q; a being a positive constant parameter measuring the reservation price and Q being the sum of all …rms'individual output levels q. Production takes place at constant returns to scale with a marginal cost c 2 [0; a) ; common to all …rms. Throughout the paper, for the sake of simplicity we set c = 0.
The production of the …nal output goes along with a negative environmental externality E = gQ, where g > 0 represents the marginal polluting intensity of output. Consumer surplus is measured by CS = Q 2 =2.
There are two possible …rm types: "pro…t-seeking" or "CSR". We denote a generic pro…t-seeking …rm as ps 2 f1; ng, and their pro…t function as ps = (p c)q ps . We denote a generic CSR …rm as csr 2 f1; ng. According to the "European Union Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility" , CSR companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations. Within the company, socially responsible practices primarily involve employees and relate to issues such as investing in human capital, health and safety, and managing change, while environmentally responsible practices relate mainly to the management of natural resources used in the production.
Out of the company, CSR practices involve a wide range of stakeholders: business partners and suppliers, customers, public authorities and local communities, as well as the environment 3 .
Thus we need to assume a speci…c CSR objective structure. For the environmental concern, we assume that the CSR …rm internalises its own 3 See http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/de…nition.php. 4 share of pollution. All the other social concerns can be interpreted in our model as part of consumer surplus, hence we assume that the CSR …rm is sensitive to it. Thus the CSR objective function is:
where z 2 [0; 1] denotes the weight that …rm csr assigns to consumer surplus.
The timing is as follows. At stage 1, every …rm decides whether to be a pro…t-seeking or a CSR type. At stage 2, they compete in quantities.
The equilibrium concept considered is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
Duopoly
We …rst examine the case with n = 2. In the stage 1, …rms 1 and 2 can decide whether to be pro…t-seeker or CSR, according to the pro…t of the second stage (Matrix 1).
M ps csr ; csr
Matrix 1
The superscript M stands for mixed duopoly (one …rm being pro…t-seeking, the other being CSR). If both …rms decide to be pro…t-seeking, the equilibrium is the PS (i.e., the standard Cournot-Nash) duopoly with q ps = a 3 and
. If both …rms decide to be CSR (CSR duopoly), the quantities in equilibrium are:
By looking at q csr , note that the sensitivity to consumer surplus z expands the output while the impact of productivity on pollution reduces it. Pro…ts are:
In the case where one …rm chooses the pro…t-seeking type and the other chooses the CSR type, the market equilibrium is given by:
and
Through the interplay in the competition stage, z and g appear into the reaction function of the pro…t-seeking …rm a¤ecting its output. Note that an increase of z positively a¤ects the output of the CSR …rm and has ambiguous e¤ects on the output of the pro…t-seeking …rm. On the other hand, g decreases both outputs but the e¤ect on the CSR is strong twice as the e¤ect on the pro…t seeking …rm. The pro…ts of the CSR …rm are:
while the pro…ts of the pro…t-seeking …rm are:
The combination of g and z determines the type of duopoly in equilibrium.
For the sake of simplicity we will focus the analysis on the case where pro…ts are positive in any possible duopoly type, according to the following lemma.
Lemma 1
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for positive pro…ts is:
Proof (1 z) ) and ps > 0 for all g 2 (0; 1) : Combining these conditions we obtain the lemma.
The following proposition shows which duopoly type occurs depending on the values of g and z (note that a can be normalised to one without changing any result).
Proposition 1
The equilibrium duopoly is:
(ii) CSR for all g 2 a (2z 
the equilibrium is the outcome of a prisoners'dilemma.
In (9)
M ps < csr for all g > a (2z 1
Region with negative pro…ts Figure 1 illustrates the combination between the impact of productivity on pollution g and the CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus z allowing a Cournot-Nash, a mixed or a CSR duopoly equilibrium. In the north-west region of Figure 1 (between g 1 and g 3 ) , the impact of productivity on pollution is quite high, so that a …rm being CSR would impose itself a substantial increase in the marginal cost. As a consequence, both …rms decide to be pro…t-seeking. As g becomes lower and the CSR sensitivity to consumer sur-plus increases, initially (between g 3 and g 4 ) the CSR pro…t is higher than the pro…t-seeking pro…t, but one …rm has the incentive to become pro…t-seeking if the other is CSR, both choose CSR and so the equilibrium is a PS generated by a prisoner's dilemma; then (between g 4 and g 5 ) the e¤ect of z becomes stronger, making the output increase compared to the pro…t-seeking case so that ps > csr , but one …rm has the incentive to become CSR if the other is pro…t-seeking. Therefore both choose to be CSR, resulting in a prisoner's dilemma in a CSR duopoly. Finally (below g 5 ) the high CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus makes a CSR …rm obtain highest pro…ts if the other is pro…t-seeking and at the same time the pro…t-seeking …rm has no desire to change type, as M ps > csr . Hence the equilibrium is mixed.
Oligopoly
We analyse now a market with n > 2. Consider the case where k 2 f1; ::; n 1g …rms are CSR and n k are pro…t-seeking, representing a generic mixed oligopoly. In this is case the market equilibrium is given by:
where the superscript k stands for "oligopoly with k CSR …rms", and q
The pro…ts of any individual pro…t-seeking …rm are
while the pro…ts of any individual CSR …rm are
Finally, the conditions of output positivity (14) ensures k ps ; k csr > 0. We obtain the stability conditions of the market structure with k CSR …rms and n k pro…t seeking …rms through the requirements for stable cartels (see D'Aspremont et al., 1983 and Donsimoni et al., 1986). A mixed oligopoly with k …rms choosing the CSR type and n k the pro…t-seeking type is stable if no one CSR …rm desires to become pro…t-seeking (internal stability) and at the same time no one pro…t-seeking …rm desires to shift to CSR (external stability). We denote as
the pro…ts of one pro…t-seeking …rm if one CSR changes its type. We denote
the pro…ts of one CSR …rm if one pro…t-seeking changes its type. Hence the stability conditions for a market structure with k CSR …rms and n k pro…t-seeking …rms are: (
where
The following proposition shows the stability conditions of the mixed oligopoly with k CSR …rms and n k pro…t-seeking …rm.
z > 2 n and k < nz 2 then the mixed oligopoly with k …rms choosing a CSR type and n k choosing a pro…t-seeking type is stable.
Proof. Inequality (20) holds for all g 2 a n 2 (kz 1) + (z (k 1))
where k < 2z + n 2z ensures that a n 2 (kz 1) + (z (k 1))
Since k 1; then 2z + n 2z > 1; which is always veri…ed for all n 2z > 0:
Inequality (21) holds for all g < a n 2 (z (k + 1) 1) + (kz)
where k < nz 2 ensures that a n 2 (z (k + 1) 1) + (kz)
Note that, given k < nz 2 and n > 2; then nz 2 > 2 and thus z > 4 n : Since nz 2 < 2z + n 2z , k < nz 2 is su¢ cient for (20). The two inequalities hold simultaneously in a range where: a n 2 (kz 1) + (z (k 1))
The condition k < nz 2 is su¢ cient to ensure that this range exists.
Finally, we verify if k ps ; k csr > 0, that is if g is within the range described in (14) . The su¢ cient condition is that the stability range is within the positive pro…t range, i.e.:
and a n 2 (kz 1) + (z (k 1))
We rearrange (27):
The numerator is positive since (n kz) (n + 1 z (k + 1)) > 1. The denominator is positive for n 2 (k + 1) 2nkz (k + 1) > 0; which holds for all k < nz 2 : We rearrange (28):
a (n + 1 kz) w n + 1 + k (n 2 1) 2nkz (k 1) + kz 2 (k 1)
2 :
The denominator is positive for k (n According to Proposition 2, the equilibrium in mixed oligopoly is stable if the number of CSR …rms is su¢ ciently low. We now show an example of mixed oligopoly using appropriate parameter values and solving numerically.
We set n = 20; a = 10 and, according to Proposition 2, z = 1=3, so that z > 4 n . Figure 2 shows Proposition 2 in the space {k; g} with k 2 (1; 19).
For all g 2 (0; 1) ; Proposition 2 holds when k is 2 or 3. 
Concluding remarks
We examined the conditions determining the stability of a mixed oligopoly where pro…t-seeking and CSR …rms coexist in the presence of an environmental externality. An equilibrium in mixed duopoly is stable for low impact of productivity on pollution and high CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus. In addition, a mixed oligopoly equilibrium is stable if the number of CSR is su¢ ciently low.
